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IN THE SUPRDIIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY NICHOLSON, Plaintiff_, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- Case No. 
SION OF UTAH, AMERICANA 9888 
CORPORATION and FIREMAN'S 
·FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding under the Industrial Act for 
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits claimed 
by plaintiff for the loss of an eye arising in the course 
of his employment with the defendant, Americana 
Corporation. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Hearings were held in this case in October and 
November of 1961. On January 17, 1962, the Industrial 
Commission made an order denying plaintiff's claim 
upon the ground that plaintiff was not an "employee" 
entitled to the benefits of the workmen's compensation 
laws. Plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The Supreme Court concluded that 
plaintiff was an "employee" and on November 26, 
1962, handed down its decision reversing the Industrial 
Commission. Although evidence had previously been 
he~rd on all issues, the defendants sought another hear-
ing on the ground that additional evidence had been 
"developed" on the issue of course of employment (R. 
8). The Commission set the case for hearing on Feb-
ruary 11, 1963, at which time further evidence was 
taken. On the 28th day of February, 1963, the Com-
mission made and entered its order by which it found 
that plaintiff was not in the course of his employment 
at the time of the accident. The order again denied 
the benefits of the Compensation Act. Plaintiff peti-
tioned for rehearing and rehearing was denied on March 
29, 1963. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari. 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the Industrial 
Commission and an order directing judgment in favor 
of plaintiff, or that failing, a new hearing. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's evidence shows that on June 27, 1961, 
plaintiff wns removing a sales kit fro1n the rear seat 
of his automobile in preparation for a demonstration 
of the sales materials. In doing so, he dislodged a seat 
cover hook which, when stretched back into place, slip-
ped out of his hand and drove a metal fastener into 
his eye. The result was complete loss of sight in his 
right eye. Defendants denied liability contending that 
plaintiff was not an employee and that the accident did 
not occur in the course of employment. This Court in 
a previous appeal held that plaintiff was an "employee" 
of the defendant within the meaning of the Industrial 
Act. Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 3, 
376 P.2d 386. The issue presented in this appeal is 
whether or not the Commission has erred in arriving 
at a finding that the accident was not employment con-
nected. 
At the time of the accident plaintiff was an em-
ployee of Americana under an employment agreement 
which required him to devote his "entire time and serv-
ices" to the sale of his employer's publications, and to 
represent the employer "in the manner directed" (Ex-
hibit 2). The plaintiff was required by Americana to 
furnish his own automobile and the same was used regu-
larly in company business (R. 19, 67). Sales work was 
performed by making appointments in advance with 
prospective purchasers. The sales presentation (pitch) 
was then made in the home. In the course of his work 
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plaintiff was furnished with a sales demonstration kij 
containing materials to be used with the pitch. Tht 
sales materials or "broadsides" were withdrawn fron: 
the sales kit in a predetermined sequence so as to co· 
ordinate the use of visual aids with the pitch. 
The accident occurred at the home of a fellow 
salesman, Dean Ellis. Nicholson had gone to the Ellis 
home in preparation for a sales trip to be taken by 
Nicholson and Ellis with the district manager and area 
manager of Americana Corporation. As part of the 
preparation for this trip Nicholson had planned to 
show Ellis a new sales pitch on a publication of the 
Americana Corporation known as the "Classics Series." 
Ellis had specifically requested of his superiors in the 
company that he be instructed on this sales pitch, and 
Nicholson had been directed by his area manager and 
also the district manager to show the pitch to Ellis. 
Plaintiff's evidence shows that the accident occurred 
while he was removing the sales kit from the rear seat 
of his automobile so that he could show the Classics 
pitch to Ellis and arrange the materials therein in proper 
order for sales presentations to be made later that day. 
Plaintiff explained the accident as follows: 
(R. 39-40) 
"Q. All right. Then what happened that day? 
Starting with the morning, if you will. I think 
you said you made some appointments for that 
evening? 
A. Yes, sir. Well, the events of that day were 
briefly I made appointments for later on in the 
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afternoon, and later on that day I had gone 
over to Dean's and cleaned up my car, washed 
my car, and swept it out, and then told Dean-
he was eating lunch at the time-so I told him 
I'd be back in a couple of hours, and I took my 
wife to a dentist appointment, picked up some 
shirts I had laundered, and come back to Dean's 
for business and to arrange our trip, and I told 
Dean I was going out to the car to-
Q. Before we get into that. When you re-
turned to his house the second time, and while 
you were there is when the accident had occurred; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir." 
(R. 41) 
"Q. Now then, after you arrived at his house 
the second time, will you relate what happened? 
A. I got to the house, and talked to Dean. I 
knocked on the door, and he said he was going 
to be out in back with his kids, so I says: 'Well, 
since we have a little time right now,' he had 
asked me to run through the classics-we had 
talked about it before-! says: 'Just a minute. 
I'll go get the kit, because I'll have to organize 
it before I can make a pitch, and also I'll run 
through, take a half hour and show you the 
classics." 
(R. 43) 
"Q. Now when you went out to get the kit 
from the car, relate exactly what happened. 
A. I opened the door on the right-hand side, 
pushed the seat forward and slid the kit out, 
and on sliding it out, I knocked loose one of the 
straps, elasticized straps that hold down the 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Terrycloth seat covers-there are, oh, about 
or 10 straps that hold it down-and, knockin 
it loose, I set the kit on the ground, reached i 
to refasten the elasticized strap, which has a litt: 
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it ot 
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook sli1 
ped out of my fingers and slipped back to g 
into my eye. It pierced my eyelid, going throug 
my eye." 
This testimony was given at the first hearing on Octobc: 
16, 1961. There was no other evidence offered at tha 
time as to the details of the accident. There was ev: 
dence corroborating the fact that plaintiff and Elli 
were due on a sales trip the day of the accident an 
that plaintiff had been directed by his superiors to in 
struct Ellis on the Classics pitch. 
At the final hearing on February 11, 1963, d€ 
fendants called three witnesses on the issue of cours 
of employment: Dean Ellis (an employee of defendan 
Americana) and Mr. and Mrs. Leo Linford ( estrange1 
in-laws of the plaintiff Nicholson). 
Though Ellis had never previously testified in th 
case, defense counsel sought to show by his testimon: 
that he had been coached by plaintiff (R. 18). Thi 
effort was unsuccessful. On cross examination, Elli1 
as defendant's employee and witness, gave the follov; 
ing significant testimony: 
(R. 21) 
"Q. Now did you associate with Mr. Nicho 
son prior to the accident, on a social basis? 
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A. Uh-uh. 
Q. What contact you did have was strictly on 
a business basis; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is you were selling for Americana, 
and he was selling for Americana? 
A. (N adding head in the affirmative.) 
Q. Answer that audibly. 
A. Yes." 
(R. 24-26) 
"Q. Now Mr. Nicholson was down at your 
home on the day of the accident? Was that cor-
rect. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why was he there? 
A. Well~ basically to get me and get ready for 
this trip~ and then he was going to show me this 
stuff too. 
Q. Were you making a sales trip on that day? 
A. Yes. They were waiting for us in Brigham. 
Q. For Americana? 
A. Well, both. Americana and, if I learned, 
the Harvard Classics. If I got it by then. 
Q. Well, the Classics was being sold by the 
Americana people; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So this trip was being taken for the pur-
pose of selling the books of the Americana Com-
pany? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And when you say they were waiting for 
you in Brigham City, this is Gene Smith and 
Harry Pledger and one other salesman; is that 
correct? 
A. I don't know if it was one or two. But 
some of the office from Ogden. 
Q. Now was there any other reason at all for 
Mr. Nicholson to be at your home on that day? 
A. No. 
Q. Now he came twice that day to your home, 
didn't he? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object 
here to your leading, Mr. Macfarlane. 
MR. MACFARLANE: It's your witness. 
THE REFEREE: Go ahead. 
A. What? 
MR. MACFARLANE: Q. Mr. Nicholson 
had been to your home twice on that day, hadn't 
he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the first time-
A. Well, yes, he was there twice. Totally. 
Q. And the first time he came to your home 
you were eating lunch; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About what time was that? 
A. I don't remember exactly. It was in the 
afternoon sometime. We eat lunch there, you 
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know, as a rule it's not 12:00 o'clock, because 
we run an orchard, and it was later in the after-
noon, but I don't know exactly what time. 
Q. All right. Did he leave, after he came and 
found you eating your lunch? 
A. Well, he went out and straightened up 
his car, and then went to pick up his wife." 
(R. 27-31) 
"Q. Now then, after he straightened up his 
car he did leave, and then subsequently returned 
to your place ; is that correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. When he returned, where were you? 
A. In the house. 
Q. What were you doing in the house? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Had you made any preparations for this 
trip? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have a sales kit? 
A. Just after he came I went out and got my 
sales kit, and was finishing straightening it up. 
You always go through your sales kit before you 
go on a trip, so you can make a presentation in a 
house. And I went out on the back lawn. Now I 
may have even been out on the back lawn when 
he came. I don't know whether this was when he 
came, or just after, or what. 
Q. Well, when he arrived at your house, were 
you or had you just been in the course of pre-
paring your sales kit for this trip? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And in preparing your sales kit, it is neces-
sary to take the materials out and arrange them 
in a specific order; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you put new contracts and new 
what they call broadsides into the kit itself; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is what you were doing when 
Larry came the second time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now when he came up to your house the 
second time, did he come up to the front door and 
knock? Or do you know? 
A. I guess. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall the substance of that 
conversation? 
A. As to the detail, or to-Just that I was to 
go get my stuff ready~ and he was going to get 
his stuff and come around~ and that was basically 
it. 
Q. Now when you say he was going to get his 
stuff~ what do you mean by that? 
A. His kit. Out of his car. 
Q. Now did he ever return with his kit? 
A. No. 
Q. And what is the next thing that you knew? 
A. My wife came out to the back door and 
hollered that Larry had been hurt~ and this was 
10 
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about, oh, several minutes later. I mean it didn,t 
just happen, you know, bang, bang. Two or 
three minutes later my wife came out, and I won-
dered where Larry was. I thought it was him, 
but she said he was hurt. Then I went in the 
house, and he was lying on the front room floor, 
with blood all over his face. 
* * * 
Q. And where was the sales kit, Mr. Nichol-
son's kit, when you returned? 
A. Well, Larry had asked me to go back and 
get the stuff that was out on the lawn. The stuff 
he had out. 
Q. Now where with reference to the door of 
the automobile, or the automobile of Mr. Nichol-
son, was the sales kit? I know you don,t know 
how many inches or how many feet, but was it 
close, or far_, or-
A. Well, it was there by the side of the car. 
Q. Now you and Mr. Nicholson were going to 
make a trip to Brigham City later that day to sell 
Americana, and that was why Mr. Nicholson was 
there; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now do you know whether or not Mr. 
Nicholson was going to show you the Classics on 
that day? 
A .Yes. 
Q. Was he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was he going to show you the Classics be-
fore this sales trip was made? 
A. Yes.,, (Emphasis added). 
11 
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Defendants apparently contend that the accident 
occurred while Nicholson was engaged in installing 
a new set of seat covers on his automobile. In support 
of this contention defendants called Leo and Lorna 
Linford, former in-laws of Nicholson. Neither of these 
people had any personal knowledge of the circum-
stances of the accident but testified as to purported 
admissions made by Nicholson following the accident. 
Lorna Linford testified that Nicholson told her: 
(R. 36-37) 
" ... he had been washing his car and putting 
this new seat cover on. He said he was just on 
the last part when this pin that hooks the seat 
cover flipped and hit him in the eye." 
Defense counsel asked Mrs. Linford if Nicholson had 
ever used the word "coached" with reference to his 
conversations with Ellis, and she replied, "I don't re-
call" (R. 37). Counsel asked if Nicholson ever used 
the term that he was going to "work out an angle," 
and Mrs. Linford replied, "I don't recall right now. 
I don't know" (R. 38). Defense counsel was then per-
mitted over timely objection to, in effect, impeach his 
own witness by referring her to a statement she had 
given to Fireman's Fund Insurance Company in No-
vember of 1962, whereupon she testified that Nicholson 
had said "he was going to work it so that he would get 
more for his eye" and "he was going to take the insur-
ance company for all they were worth" (R. 39-40). 
Mrs. Linford testified that she contacted the insurance 
12 
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company on her own initiative in November of 1962 
(R. 40). 
The cross examination of Mrs. Linford was very 
revealing. After the first hearings in October and 
November of 1961 and before November of 1962 when 
the Linfords contacted Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Company, several significant events occurred. Nicholson 
had been married to Linfords' daughter, Darlene. They 
were divorced in the fall of 1961 (R. 41). Darlene went 
to California and the two children of the marriage 
(Curtis and Sherry) remained with the Linfords in 
their home (R. 41). The Linfords were very attached 
to these children. In December of 1961, Nicholson 
took custody of Curtis, though the Linfords were very 
much opposed to allowing him to take the child from 
their home (R. 43). Mrs. Linford acknowledged that 
there was a feeling of "animosity and bitterness" that 
developed as a result of the divorce and Nicholson's 
assumption of the custody of his child (R. 44). Nichol-
son continued to visit his daughter, Sherry, at the Lin-
ford home, but notwithstanding his requests he was 
not permitted to take the child at any time for a full 
day (R. 45). Meanwhile, Darlene was sent to prison 
in California for misapplication of bank funds (R. 46). 
Mrs. Linford testified that she felt Nicholson was to 
blame for the divorce of her daughter and that he was 
also to blame for the trouble Darlene got into in Cali-
fornia (R. 46-47). In August of 1962, Mrs. Linford 
took Sherry to California with her to visit Darlene 
(R. 47). She planned to stay "a week or a little longer" 
13 
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(R. 47). Upon learning that his child was to be taken 
out of the state, Nicholson filed a petition for custody 
of Sherry in the District Court of Weber County nam-
ing the Linfords as defendants. Mrs. Linford learned 
of the petition when she arrived in California and she 
stayed there for two n1onths moving from place to place 
because of the "trouble he was causing" (R. 50). Dar-
lene was released from prison in October of 1962, and 
Mrs. Linford remained in California with her a while, 
moving from Los Angeles to San Francisco ( R. 53) . 
She then left Darlene, instructing her not to tell Nichol-
son where she was ( R. 53). Mrs. Linford returned to 
Utah with the custody of Sherry still very much in 
her mind. Asked as to her attitude in November of 
1962 (when the insurance company was contacted), 
Mrs. Linford testified: 
(R. 55-56) 
"Q. Yours was an attitude of considerable 
bitterness toward Mr. Larry Nicholson at that 
time, was it not? 
A. For all the expense and trouble he had 
caused. He had called our home, and threatened 
that he would u,se every cent that he would get 
from this insurance company to do everything he 
could. 
Q. So that in contacting the insurance com-
pany, your motive wp,s to hurt him at that time; 
isn,t that correct? 
A. For all he had put 1ts through, yes. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that you had told him on 
14 
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many occasions prior to November of 1962, that 
you hoped that he would get his money? That 
he was entitled to it? 
A. I hoped he got something from it, yes. Be-
cause he was entitled for having his eye hurt. 
Q. Didn't you tell him you thought he was 
entitled to be compensated? 
A. To get something, yes ... " (Emphasis 
added). 
Mrs. Linford was apparently concerned as to how 
Nicholson would use the money he got from the insur-
ance company. Notwithstanding her instruction to 
Darlene not to communicate with Larry, Darlene called 
Larry and arranged to place Sherry in her father's 
custody ( R. 54-55) . Both Curtis and Sherry were in 
their father's custody at the time of the second hearing. 
Leo Linford was called by defendants pursuant to 
subpoena. Defense counsel stated at the commencement 
of the hearing that Leo Linford had called him from 
Ogden about 7:00 o'clock a.m. that morning to advise 
counsel that Linford "had only a little French car 
and the highway patrol was not letting sports cars on 
the highway" and that Mrs. Linford "was in Califor-
nia" and "not available at the present time" (R. 13, 
14). Counsel advised Linford that he would have 
to contact the Industrial Commission to be excused. 
Shortly after the commencement of the hearing, which 
started at 9:00 o'clock a.m., Linford and his wife walked 
into the hearing room (See R. 21) . 
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The exclusion rule had been invoked and Linford 
did not have the opportunity to hear his wife testify 
before he took the stand. His wife had testified that 
she and her husband took the initiative in contacting 
the insurance company in November of 1962 (R. 40). 
Leo Linford said that he didn't remember whether he 
contacted the insurance company or whether the com-
pany contacted him ( R. 66, 67) , though he did remem-
ber clearly some purported conversations that took 
place a year prior to the contact with the insurance 
company ( R. 67) . 
Leo Linford testified over objection that he "be-
lieved" that Dean Ellis was in the hospital room on 
the day of the accident along with Nicholson's parents 
( R. 61 ) and that Ellis "said that Larry Nicholson 
was putting seat covers on his car, after having washed 
it, and that the last hook that he had to fasten didn't 
make the connection and sprung out and hit him in 
the eye" (R. 63). Linford said that Larry later told 
him "the same story" (R. 64). Linford also stated that 
Nicholson said "he had worked out an angle" (R. 64} 
and that he was "going to have to work on Mr. Ellis." 
Linford said he thought the latter conversation took 
place after the first hearing in October of 1961 (R. 66). 
Linford's cross examination, like that of his wife, 
disclosed that there was a great deal of antagonism 
between him and Larry as a result of the divorce, his 
daughter's imprisonment and the custody fight for 
Nicholson's two children (R. 70-72). 
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Larry Nicholson was called at the final hearing and 
he testified again that he went to the Ellis home twice 
on the day of the accident. On the first occasion Ellis 
was eating his lunch and so Nicholson washed his car 
and cleaned it out lightly (R. 77). Nicholson then left 
to handle some personal business, after which he re· 
turned again to the Ellis home ( R. 77) . On the second 
occasion he took no action to clean the car or set it in 
order (R. 78). Defense counsel objected to going into 
the details of the accident since Nicholson's testimony 
was already in the record from the first hearing (about 
16 months before) (R. 78). Plaintiff's counsel refrained 
from again eliciting the details of the accident from 
Nicholson upon the assurance from the Commissioner 
that the earlier testimony would be reviewed and con-
sidered in deciding the case (R. 78. See also R. 12). 
Nicholson testified that the seat covers were not 
new and that he had purchased them several months 
before (R. 79). This was corroborated by Ellis (R. 
17). He said that when the custody fight was initiated 
in August of 1962, Leo Linford threatened to shoot 
him (R. 81). He denied that he had told the Linfords 
that he was putting on new seat covers when the acci-
dent occurred or that he had said he was working an 
angle or coaching Ellis ( R. 79-80) . 
Larry Nicholson's father, Robert A. Nicholson, 
testified that in August of 1962, Leo Linford called him 
and told him that he (Linford) "had told Larry what 
he would do to him. He advised me to keep Larry away 
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from him. That he was certainly going to even the score" 
(R. 83-84). Larry's father testified that Linford called 
him again (during the course of the custody fight) and 
told him how upset he was with Larry (R. 84). Robert 
Nicholson denied that the Linf ords were ever in the 
hospital room with him and his wife and Larry (R. 87) 
and testified that the Linfords had never had any dis-
cussion with Larry about the accident in Mr. Nichol-
son's presence (R. 87). 
Ellis was recalled and testified that he never told 
the Linfords that the accident occurred while seat covers 
were being installed (R. 91). He said that Larry had 
not told him what to say or how to say it (R. 91). 
At the close of the evidence the case was taken 
under advisement, and on the 28th day of February 
the Commission handed down its decision whereby it 
concluded that Nicholson was not in the course of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
This appeal challenges that finding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER. OF THE COMMISSION 
SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THE COMMIS-
SION, CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATED 
PLAN OF PROCEDURE, IGNORED THE 
EVIDENCE OFFERED AT THE FIRST 
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liEARING AND ERRONEOUSLY INTER-
PRETED THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT 
THE FINAL HEARING. 
Plaintiff's testimony on the occurrence of the acci-
dent was taken before Roland G. Robinson, Jr., referee, 
on October 16, 1961. The final hearing on February 
11, 1963, was conducted by Commissioner Otto A. 
Wiesley. At the commencement of that hearing the 
following understanding was had between counsel and 
the referee: 
(R. 12) 
"MR. MACF All-LANE: As I understand it, 
the purpose of this hearing is in effect the re-
opening of the record, to take additional evidence 
on the issue of course of employment. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right. 
THE REFEREE: Yes. 
MR. MACFARLANE: And we would ex-
pect, if it's agreeable with the Commission, that 
all evidence heretofore received would be con-
sidered in determining that question, together 
with what additional evidence might be adduced 
at this time. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE REFEREE: That is absolutely neces-
sary. The whole record is in evidence. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. We under-
stood that. 
THE REFEREE: You may proceed then, 
Mr. Christensen." 
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During the course of the hearing plaintiff's counsel 
sought to review some of the testimony of Nicholson 
pertaining to the details of the accident, and the follow-
ing . discussion took place : 
(R. 78) 
"Q. And why were you there on the second 
occasion? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object 
to all this as repetitious. 
A. Company business. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The whole thing 
is in the original transcript. 
THE REFEREE: I haven't read the tran-
script for some time. I wouldn't remember. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I read it last night, 
Mr. Commissioner. It was there then. 
THE REFEREE: If it is in the record, 
Mr. Macfarlane, of course we'll agree no pur-
pose can be served by repeating it now. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Will your practice 
be, Mr. Wiesley, to await the preparation of a 
transcript in this hearing, and then read it all 
over and consider it all? 
THE REFEREE: Oh, yes. We'd have to, 
yes. 
MR. MACFARLANE: All right." 
It was thus clear that all of the testimony previously 
offered on the issue of course of employment was to 
be considered by the Commission in arriving at a find-
Ing. 
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The order of the Commission demonstrates that 
the testimony offered at the first hearing was ignored. 
The first paragraph of the order discussing the evidence 
says: 
(R. 94) 
"l\Ir. Ellis (companion salesman) testified 
that the eye injury occurred when applicant 
went to get his stuff (sales kit) out of the car. 
It seems more probable that a pin would flip 
and strike an eye during the process of pinning 
seat covers than when removing a sales kit from 
a car.~~ (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff gave the following testimony at the first hear-
Ing: 
(R. 43) 
"A. I opened the door on the right-hand side, 
pushed the seat forward and slid the kit out, and 
on sliding it out I knocked loose one of the 
straps, elasticized straps that hold down the 
Terrycloth seat covers-there are, oh, about 8 
or 10 straps that hold it down-and, knocking 
it loose, I set the kit on the ground, reached in 
to refasten the elasticized strap, which has a little 
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it out 
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook slipped 
out of my fingers and slipped back to go into 
my eye. It pierced my eyelid, going through my 
eye." 
The quoted portion of the Commission's order shows 
that the commissioners assumed applicant's contention 
to be that the strap in some unexplained way flipped 
into his eye when the kit was being removed. Such 
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an assumption could not have prevailed had the Com-
mission considered the testimony offered at the first hear-
ing. The damaging nature of the unwarranted assump-
tion is obvious. The possibility of a fastener striking 
an eye while removing the kit from the vehicle is remote. 
The prospect of injury in refastening the strap is just 
as great as the prospect of injury in initially installing 
the strap. 
The order next recites: 
(R. 95) 
"It was never established why the sales kit was 
outside the car on the ground, but nearby, after 
the injury occurred. It may have been placed 
there by applicant so he could go about install-
ing seat covers. He may have dropped them 
there following the eye injury. Had his eye been 
struck while removing the kit from the car, he 
most likely would have dropped them instantly 
in the car." 
There are only two possible explanations for a state-
ment such as this: Either ( 1) the Commission failed 
to consider plaintiff's testimony, or ( 2) the Commission 
did not exercise good faith in reviewing the record. We 
choose to believe the first alternative. Either would be 
grounds for reversal. Contrary to the order, it was 
established why the sales kit was outside the car on 
the ground after the injury occurred. After testifying 
that a strap was dislodged as the sales kit was slid out, 
Nicholson said: 
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(R. 43) 
"I set the kit on the ground, reached in to 
refasten the elasticized strap, which has a little 
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it out 
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook slipped 
out of my fingers and slipped back to go into my 
eye." 
Not having considered this testimony the Commission 
could not understand why the kit did not drop instantly 
in the car. 
Thus, in failing to review or to consider the plain-
tiff's testimony the Commission was laboring under the 
following false and unwarranted assumptions: 
(1) 
(2) 
That plaintiff contended the accident to 
have occurred when the sales kit was slid 
out of the automobile; 
That plaintiff made no explanation of the 
presence of the kit outside of the automo-
bile. 
These false assumptions led to the conclusions (a) 
that it was more probable that a pin would flip into 
plaintiff's eye while attaching seat covers than while 
removing a kit from the car; (b) that had the accident 
occurred as plaintiff contended, he would have naturally 
dropped the kit in the car; and (c) that the presence 
of the kit outside of the car actually corroborated the 
contention that planitiff was installing seat covers at 
the time of the accident. The foregoing conclusions were 
all fundamental to the determination which the Com-
mission made and were all based upon false assumptions 
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which could not have been made had the Commission 
considered the testimony offered at the first hearing. 
The order of the Commission also shows a careless 
appraisal of the testimony of the Linfords. In reviewing 
such testimony the order says: 
(R. 95) 
"She testified that she took the initiative in 
conveying the information to the insurance ad-
juster after the divorce of her daughter from 
the applicant. One would not expect a mother-
in-law to volunteer such information when fam-
ily relations are as they should be. One might, 
after a divorce and bitter feelings generated over 
custody of children." 
The evidence was that the divorce occurred in the 
fall of 1961. There was no testimony to the effect that 
the divorce proceedings followed the hearings of Octo-
ber and November, 1961. This was not the fact. Though 
we do not consider this to be of great importance, it 
appears from the foregoing portion of the order that 
the Commission considered the date of the divorce to be 
important and acted on an erroneous assumption in that 
regard. 
The order of the Commission next reads: 
(R. 95) 
"We doubt that she [Mrs. Linford] would so 
readily have admitted taking the initiative in 
conveying information to the insurance adjuster 
if it were not factual." 
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This statement is incredibly naive and contradictory. 
It assumes that the witness (Mrs. Linford) would have 
lied about contacting the insurance company if the 
information she had was not factual and that the very 
fact that she admitted making the initial contact with 
the insurance company bolsters her credibility. Mrs. 
Linford perhaps concluded that she was not in a posi-
tion to deny that she made the initial contact with the 
insurance adjuster confronting her at the hearing. 
Further, she had every reason to give the insurance 
company information which would prevent Nicholson 
from succeeding in his claim. She was forced to admit 
the bitter and hostile attitude she had toward Larry. 
A custody battle in which the Linfords were vitally 
interested was being waged at the time. Mrs. Linford 
testified that Nicholson had threatened to use the money 
he obtained in the settlement in carrying on the battle. 
There was ample explanation for her initiative in con-
tacting the insurance company. It is interesting to note 
that rather than believe that Mrs. Linford was moti-
vated by her admitted desire to "hurt Larry" ( R. 56) , 
the Commission finds that she must have been telling 
the truth because otherwise she would have lied about 
contacting the adjuster herself. 
In the very next paragraph of the order the Com-
mission acknowledges that "the father-in-law said the 
insurance adjuster solicited the information rather than 
he and his wife had taken the initiative." No comment 
is made on this finding, but under the process of reason-
ing followed in the preceding paragraph of the Com-
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mission's order it follows that one of the Linfords is 
not telling the truth and that the rest of their testimony 
is therefore unworthy of belief (R. 95). Actually the 
evidence showed that the father-in-law "could not re-
member" who made the contact (R. 66, 67). Having 
concluded, as it did however, and considering the weight 
apparently placed on the initial contact, it is difficult 
to see how the Commission could reconcile the conflict-
ing statements of these two witnesses upon which it 
bases the entire order. The Commission also ignores 
the fact that Leo Linford obviously lied to Mr. Chris-
tensen when he told him on the morning of the hearing 
that Mrs. Linford was in California and would be unable 
to attend the hearing that morning (R. 13, 14, 21). 
The order of the C9mmission next says: 
(R. 95) 
"Applicant testified that to the best of his 
recollection he told his family that he got the 
hook into his eye when attempting to refasten 
the seat cover. This occurred at the hospital." 
The applicant did not testify that he had any such 
conversation at the hospital. On the contrary, he was 
under sedation at the time the Linfords claim to have 
visited him in the hospital room and not able to discuss 
the accident (R. 79). He did testify that in explaining 
the accident he simply said that the injury occurred 
while attempting to refasten the seat cover hook (R. 
79). 
The Commission next finds: 
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(R. 95) 
"In spite of the family differences over the 
divorce and custody of the children, we choose 
to believe the testimony of Lorna Linford and 
her husband, Leo George Linford." 
It is submitted that a reading of the opinion will 
demonstrate that the Commission "chose" to believe 
the Linfords without considering the testimony of 
Nicholson. But what significance lies in the testimony 
of the Linfords? If true, the Commission could believe 
that Nicholson admitted that he was putting on seat 
covers at the time of the accident; that he had an 
"angle," and that he was going to get Ellis to go along 
with him. None of these conclusions should defeat re-
covery. Nicholson was in the act of fastening a seat 
cover hook. If he said he was going to work "an angle," 
this cannot be fairly construed to mean that the claim 
was fabricated or fraudulent without some explanation 
of the details. Fraud and fabrication are not proved 
in such a manner. The statement that he was going to 
"work on Ellis" also falls short of the evidentiary 
requirements of proof of fraud and fabrication. In 
believing the Linfords the Commission received no 
assistance whatever as what actually occurred at the 
time Nicholson lost his eye. Neither of the Linfords 
were present or claim to have any personal knowledge 
of the circumstances of the accident, and the Commis-
sion failed to take into account that the defense witness 
Ellis (who was defendant's employee at the time of 
the accident) corroborated plaintiff's version of the 
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accident. Instead of taking this into account, the Com-
mission saw fit to comment that Ellis (a defense wit-
ness) was "evasive" (R. 95) and to attach that stigma 
to plaintiff. 
Finally, the Commission concludes that Nicholson 
was not in the course of his employment (a) because 
he and Ellis were not on their way to Brigham City 
at the time of the injury; (b) because replacing or 
fastening seat covers was not done in the course of 
employment; and (c) because the instruction in the 
sale of Classics had not begun at the time of the accident. 
Such conclusions callously ignore the fact that no sales 
presentation could be made and no instructions on the 
Classics pitch commenced until the sales kit was re-
moved from the rear seat of plaintiff's automobile, 
and that as an incident to the removal of the kit plain-
tiff was required to replace a fastener dislodged by the 
removal of the kit. The accident was thus occasioned 
as a direct result of necessary employment connected 
activity. 
There is not a single paragraph of the Commis-
sion's order (following the J:eCital of the history of the 
case) which does not contain significant error. It is 
respectfully submitted that the Commission "chose" 
to decide this case for the defendants on the basis of 
the final hearing only, without consideration of the evi· 
dence offered at the first hearing and without a fair 
and impartial consideration of the evidence received at 
the final hearing. 
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POINT II. 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE COM-
PELS A FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
\VAS IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY-
1\IENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The Industrial Commission acts in excess of its 
powers when it arbitrarily disregards or unreasonably 
refuses to believe material, substantial, competent and 
uncontradicted evidence. Dale v. Industrial Commis-
sion) 115 Utah 311, 204 P.2d 462; Jones v. California 
Packing Corp.J 121 Utah 612, 244 P .2d 640; Wood-
burn v. Industrial Comrn.~ Ill Utah 393, 181 P.2d 209. 
This is such a case. 
A review of the entire record establishes the fol-
lowing undisputed facts. When Nicholson was em-
ployed by Americana, he was required to furnish his 
own automobile. He used his automobile in his work 
and it was essential to the performance of his duties. 
The district manager of the defendant, as well as 
Nicholson and Ellis, testified that a sales trip to Brig-
ham City had been planned for the day of the accident. 
Nicholson was to take his automobile on this trip, and 
Ellis was to take his. Nicholson went to the Ellis home 
on the day of the accident to prepare for the trip. 
Nicholson had no reason to go to the Ellis home except 
for business purposes, and his sole motive in going there 
on the day of the accident was to instruct Ellis on the 
Classics pitch and prepare for the sales trip. 
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The accident occurred while Nicholson was fasten-
Ing a seat cover hook. Nicholson testified that the 
hook was being refastened after having become dis-
lodged by the sales kit, and defendants apparently con-
tend that a set of seat covers was being installed. In 
either event, preparations for the sales trip were under 
way. Nicholson had embarked upon his work in going 
to Ellis' home to arrange his sales kit and demonstrate 
the Classics pitch. The accident occurred under plain-
tiffs' evidence as an incident to removal of the sales 
kit from his automobile. Under defendants' theory it 
occurred while plaintiff was conditioning his car for use. 
The Commission recognized that Nicholson's trip 
to the Ellis home was in contemplation of a sales trip 
( R. 95) , but concluded that the accident was not within 
the scope of the Act because the trip had not actually 
started and instruction on the Classics pitch had not 
commenced ( R. 95) . This narrow construction of the 
Act is not in accordance with the cases. 
Our statute permits recovery for injury "arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employment, wheresoever 
such injury occurred" ( §35-1-45, U.C.A., 1953). The 
words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of 
injury, and the words "in the course of" refer to the 
time, place and circumstances of the injury. Utah Apex 
Mining Company v. Industrial Commission_, 67 Utah 
537, 248 Pac. 490. This Court has held that the statute 
should be liberally construed and that if there is any 
doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt 
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should be resolved in favor of recovery. Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission .. 55 Utah 213, 184 Pac. 1020; 
Ill & 1( Corp. v. Industrial Commission_, 112 Utah 488, 
189 p .2d 132. 
Clearly if the accident occurred as an incident to 
removal of the sales kit, it "arose out of" and "in the 
course of" employment. Under the circumstances of 
this case it cannot in good faith be contended that trans-
portation and removal of the kit was not employment 
connected. These were essential acts in the performance 
of the employer's work, and incidents directly connected 
with such acts are likewise employment connected. 
Plaintiff contends that the Commission was arbitrary 
and capricious in refusing to adopt Nicholson's version 
of the accident because his testimony was corroborated 
by defendant's own witness and employee. The testi-
mony of Ellis established (I) that Nicholson had come 
to his home solely for a business purpose; ( 2) that 
Ellis had requested instruction on the Classics pitch 
and Nicholson had agreed to furnish it; (3) that Nichol-
son and Ellis discussed preparations for the trip upon 
Nicholson's arrival; ( 4) that Nicholson went out to 
his car to get his sales kit; ( 5) that "two or three min-
utes" later Ellis' wife came to him to report that Nichol-
son had been injured; ( 6) that Nicholson was found 
by Ellis with his injured eye, and (7) that Nicholson's 
sales kit was found beside his car after the accident. 
The defendants should be bound by the testimony of 
their witness in the foregoing important particulars. 
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The contention that the Commission acted arbi-
trarily does not ignore the testimony of the Linfords. 
Such testimony is in the category of that referred to in 
Jones on Evidence (2nd Ed.) , page 620: 
"It is a familiar rule that verbal admissions 
should be received with caution and subjected 
to careful scrutiny, as no class of evidence is 
more subject to error or abuse. Witnesses having 
the best motives are generally unable to state 
the exact language of an admission, and are 
liable, by the omission or the changing of words, 
to convey a false impression of the language 
used. No other class of testimony affords such 
temptations or opportunities for unscrupulous 
witnesses to torture the facts or commit open 
perjury, as it is often impossible to contradict 
their testimony at all, or at least by any other 
witness than the party himself. These and similar 
considerations have often led the courts to de-
clare that admissions are evidence of low grade 
-the weakest and most unsatisfactory form of 
evidence.'' 
It is the rule in many juris dictions that admissions 
inconsistent with a party's testimony go merely to the 
credibility of the witness and have no probative value 
as direct evidence. Eastman v. Lake Shore & M. S. 
Ry. Co., 101 Mich. 597, 60 N.W. 309; Allen v. Large} 
239 S.W. 2d 225; Gams v. Oberholtzer~ 50 Wash. 2d 
174, 310 P.2d 240. Under this rule Nicholson's testi-
mony as corroborated by Ellis stands uncontradicted 
by direct evidence. If the testimony of the Linfords 
is given the probative force of direct evidence, such 
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testimony when analytically considered still does not 
impeach the evidence offered by Nicholson and Ellis. 
But even assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff 
was installing or replacing seat covers at the time of his 
accident, such work, under the circumstances of this 
case, was still within the scope of the Act. It is un-
disputed that plaintiff was making preparations for a 
sales trip and that he was to use his own automobile 
in connection with such trip. He had embarked upon 
his master's business in going to the Ellis home with a 
business motive. The fact that he may have been con-
ditioning his own automobile is not fatal to his cause. 
In Struve v. City of Fremont~ 125 Neb. 463, 250 
N.W. 663, the applicant was killed by carbon monoxide 
gas while tuning up his ·automobile used principally in 
the employer's business. The accident occurred early 
in the morning while the applicant was "preparing'~ 
to attend a convention in his employer's business. The 
court said: 
"The deceased was preparing his car to carry 
him to his fireman's duty, it matters not whether 
to his morning inspection or to Omaha to his 
fireman's school." 
It was held that the accident was within the scope of 
his employment. 
In Green v. Hiestand Bros.~ et al.~ 103 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 515, 157 Atl. 44, the employee, a traveling salesman, 
was repairing his car in order to complete his employ-
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ment for the day and in doing so was overcome by car-
bon monoxide gas. In holding that the accident was in 
the course of employment, the court said: 
"We think the only legitimate inferences to 
be drawn ... are that the decedent's employment 
for July 9, 1930, had not been terminated at the 
time of his accidental death and that the accident 
happened while he was repairing an instrumen-
tality (necessary to the proper rendition of the 
services required of him) preparatory to going 
to the Noel Bakery to make a collection for his 
employers." 
In Derleth v. Roach & Seeber Co.~ 227 Mich. 258, 
198 N.W. 948, the employee suffered an accident while 
preparing his own automobile for use on the following 
day in connection with his employment. He was testing 
his batteries in order to insure that he would be able 
to make the trip by automobile. The court held that the 
accident arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. 
In Kingsley v. Donovan~ 169 App. Div. 828, 155 
N.Y. Supp. 801, the employee used a motorcycle in 
going to and from work. He received an injury while 
engaged in cleaning the motorcycle after arrival at 
work, and the New York court held that the accident 
was compensable. 
In Hilyard v. Lohmann-J ohnson Drilling Co., 167 
Kan. 177, 211 P .2d 89, the employee was working on 
his own personal car which had no connection with his 
employment whatever. It was shown, however, to be 
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1 common custom for employees to work on their per-
;onal cars in their spare time while on the job. In de-
termining that the accident occurred "in the course of" 
employment, the court simply commented that at the 
time the claimant sustained his injuries he was in his 
employer's services. The court then went on to conclude 
that the accident also "arose out of" the employment. 
In so holding the court said: 
" ... At 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compen-
sation, § 235, it is said: 'An injury is not neces-
sarily rendered noncompensable by the fact that 
at the time of its occurrence the employee was 
engaged in the performance of some act for the 
benefit of himself or a third person, since such 
an act may, in many instances, be so related 
to or connected with the employment as to make 
it a reasonable incident thereof.' ... It is not 
essential that the employee be engaged in an act 
directly beneficial to his employer in order that 
the resulting injury may be said to have arisen 
out of the employment, and the fact that the 
employee's action may have been impelled by a 
personal motive does not prevent the application 
of the compensation statute. 
* * * 
"The words 'causal connection' certainly do 
not mean that the accident must have resulted 
directly and immediately from performance of 
the work for which the workman was employed. 
Such a narrowed interpretation would mean that 
~henever a workman was not directly engaged 
In the actual work to be done he would be without 
protection under the law. '~ 
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An analysis of the entire record reveals that regard-
less of the motive and the reason for fastening the seat 
cover strap, Nicholson was in preparation for sales 
services and was working on an instrumentality neces-
sary for use in such services. He had gone to the Ellis 
home with one motive, and that was in furtherance of 
his work with the defendant Americana. 
Though it may be argued that there would be 
personal benefit to Nicholson in placing his own per-
sonal automobile in order, it cannot be logically con-
tended that this had no connection whatever with his 
employment. The law does not require that the sales-
man be actually engaged in the sale of books at the time 
an injury occurs. Preparation of the automobile was a 
necessary incident to his employment. We understand 
the general rule to be that even where an act incidental 
to employment is performed for the employee's benefit, 
it will not preclude compensation. This rule is stated in 
99 C.J.S. 744-745 as follows: 
" ... The fact that the incidental act which 
caused the injury was performed for the em-
ployee's benefit will not necessarily preclude 
compensation where the act was performed in 
the course of employment or where such activity 
had become an incident to the employment . ... 
It is not essential that the employee be engaged 
in an act directly beneficial to his employer in 
order that the resulting injury may be said to 
have arisen out of the employment, and the fact 
that the employee's action may have been im· 
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pelled by a personal motive does not prevent the 
application of the compensation statute. 
* * * 
"Where the employee is primarily engaged in 
carrying out his employer's purposes, and his 
conduct for personal reasons is merely incidental 
thereto, he is acting in the course of his employ-
ment. Where the act is within the employment, 
it is immaterial that the predominate motive of 
the employee is to benefit himself .... " 
It is earnestly submitted that a review of the entire 
record compels the conclusion that the accident arose 
out of or in the course of Nicholson's employment with 
Americana. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN THE CONDUCT OF THE 
HEARING AND ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR RE-
HEARING. 
A review of the entire transcript of the final hear-
ing will demonstrate that the Linfords, whose testimony 
forms the basis of the Commission's order, were ap-
parently reluctant to appear at the hearing. They had 
contacted the insurance company during the heat of a 
custody battle and furnished written statements. Then 
at the time of the hearing when it became necessary 
for them to go under oath and testify, Mr. Linford 
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called counsel with a flimsy excuse for his own inability 
to attend and an apparent untruth about his wife being 
out of the state. The record will show that Mrs. Linford 
would not state under oath the claim she apparently 
initially made to the insurance company until defense 
counsel was permitted to in effect impeach her by asking 
leading questions and referring her to a statement taken 
for the defendants' own use (R. 37-40). Though we 
recognize that the Commission is not bound by formal 
rules of evidence, it appears to the plaintiff that it was 
an abuse of the Commission's discretion for it to allow 
testimony which it considered so vital to be wrung out 
of defense witnesses by impeachment tactics. 
The record also shows the impatience of the Com-
mission in permitting a broad scope of cross examina· 
tion of the Linfords (R. 46, 50, 51, 72). Further, it 
appears that defendants' request to offer additional 
evidence following the first appeal was readily granted 
(R. 8, 9), whereas plaintiff's request for a rehearing 
to offer additional evidence was promptly denied (R. 
96, 97, 99) . Taking the record as a whole, plaintiff con· 
tends that he was deprived of a fair hearing of the 
Issues. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the 
Industrial Commission is contrary to law and that the 
same should be reversed with instructions to award com· 
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pensation in accordance with the Industrial Act, or 
in the alternative, that the matter should be remanded 
for further hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Grant Macfarlane, Jr. 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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